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THE ELEMENTARY SCHOOL TEACHER

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THE SCHOOL'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR DEVELOPING THE CONTROLS OF CONDUCT ¹

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Not long ago I read a newspaper anecdote that will, I think, make clear the character of the problem that I wish to discuss with you. I do not know whether this anecdote is a record of an actual occurrence or merely a bit of imaginative space-filling. In either case, however, it will serve my purpose. It had reference to the long list of railroad accidents that was just then horrifying the country, and it told the story of a young telegraph operator who had been brought to trial on the charge of criminal negligence. It appeared from the evidence that a serious disaster had occurred as a direct result of this young man's failure to perform the duty that had been assigned him, and it further appeared that his failure was due to no other factor than that which, for want of a more definite term, we call "carelessness." The attorney for the defense sought to establish the young man's good character by the testimony of a number of men and women who had been the defendant's teachers when he was a boy at school. He called one of these teachers to the witness stand and asked him this question: "What kind of a boy was the defendant?" And the witness replied that he had been a very good boy—diligent in his studies, never mischievous, and always companionable with his fellow-pupils and popular

¹ A lecture delivered before the College of Education, The University of Chicago, November 21, 1907.

with his instructors. As the witness gave his testimony, the face of the defendant brightened and his attorney smiled hopefully. But when the defense had completed the direct examination and the prosecuting attorney began the cross-questioning, the bright looks vanished and the smile was changed to a frown. For, after repeating the question of his colleague and receiving the same answer, the prosecuting attorney suddenly turned upon the witness and asked: "Was this young man a careless boy at school? Was he what you would call a careless pupil?" And the witness, after an awkward hesitation, finally admitted that the boy had been a little careless, but was, withal, a good boy and an exemplary pupil. "But," persisted the attorney, "what did you do to change him in this respect? Having recognized his carelessness, what did you do to break up his bad habits and replace them with better habits?" And the witness, reluctantly and with not a little confusion, was finally compelled to answer, "Nothing!"

Now, as I have intimated, this little anecdote may be purely imaginative, but it certainly raises a possible question with regard to the functions and responsibilities of education that cannot be brushed to one side as irrelevant and impractical. After all, what is education for? We have advanced far beyond the point where we thought of education as chiefly concerned with the acquisition of knowledge—with the cramming of the mind with facts and theories and laws and principles. We have got beyond the primitive conception of education as the process by means of which youth is endowed with certain "earmarks" of culture. We have left these inadequate conceptions behind, and have gradually come to the much broader view that education must fit the child for life and work and service and production in a complex social environment to the demands of which nature has very imperfectly adapted him. Social efficiency, formulated though it may be in diverse ways, is becoming the conscious aim of all educational effort.

As a result of this development, education is coming to its own as a human institution. As one writer has intimated, it has attained to its majority and is coming into its kingdom.

And as in individuals, so in institutions, the first sign of approaching maturity is a hypertrophied self-consciousness. Like the adolescent youth, education is filled with a deep sense of its power, a yearning to know and test its function, an analytic impulse which leads it to unravel its mysteries, and to organize its efforts with foresight and intelligence toward the goal that it seeks to attain. And with these longings and strivings and yearnings, if I may continue the metaphor, is mingled now and then an undertone of foreboding, as if the task that lay before it were too stupendous for its powers; as if the problem that had been set it for solution—by far the most intricate and complicated that any human institution has yet attempted—were much too intricate and complicated for any human institution to solve. And so we find, now and then, an expression of pessimism, just as we find a marked tendency toward pessimism in individual adolescence—a tendency to distrust the power that education possesses, a temptation to repudiate nurture and hark back to nature, to discount the forces of the environment and magnify those of heredity, to take but a half-hearted hope in the school while we await, as patiently as we can, the arrival of the superman.

There can be no doubt that just such reflections upon the worth and efficiency of school training as that expressed by the prosecuting attorney of my anecdote contribute no small share to whatever pessimism one may feel. In what measure must the school hold itself responsible for the failure of its products to meet the demands imposed by social and industrial conditions? It would seem perfectly obvious that the effort of the teacher is quite without value unless, in some way or another, it modifies the conduct of his pupils. If those who come to me for instruction and training act in no way more effectively after they leave me than they would have acted had they never come under my influence, my work as a teacher must be adjudged a failure. Certainly if they act less effectively, my work is more than a failure—it is a catastrophe. And furthermore the fact that I could not foresee the results, the fact that I did my duty as I saw it, might mitigate the blame, but it could in no way mitigate the

catastrophe. The pathetic lament of one of the greatest of our university presidents over the fact that so many of the men who figured prominently in the recent scandals of the business world were graduates of his own institution is a sad commentary on the failure of what we believe to be the most efficient training effectively to dominate or control conduct in really critical situations. And the terse criticism of my prosecuting attorney, whether the anecdote be fact or fiction, could find an easy sanction in the minds of thousands of business men who are looking to the schools for the raw material of efficient service.

Now it is clear that the responsibility of the school for the development of the controls of conduct must depend upon the degree in which the factors of control can be developed by the educative forces of the school. It is easy to make an offhand judgment in either direction. We can assume that the telegrapher's carelessness was due to a bad heredity, or to an inadequate home training, or to forces that operated after he left school. It would be hard to prove that all or even one of these factors could not be accounted sufficiently strong to counteract the results of school training. On the other hand, one might reasonably assert that the telegrapher's inefficiency was manifestly due to the lack of a certain set of habits which school work can and must develop, and that the admission of his teachers that these habits had been neglected is a sufficient evidence of their culpability.

It is a platitude to say that nine-tenths of human conduct is determined by the factor of habit. Educational theory has always recognized this basic truth, and, in a certain sense, it has always recognized the duty of the school to develop efficient habits. But even now educational theory is far from a due appreciation either of the wide scope or of the tremendous difficulty of the task. Indeed, until recently, educational methods, while assuming that habits were to be developed, seemed to have but a vague conception of what the development of a habit really means. One may cite the habits of speech as a convenient and definite illustration. It is only within a few years that futility of mere grammatical instruction in improving the efficiency of

expression has been fully recognized. True, the study of formal grammar taught the pupil certain rules and principles that should have operated in the formation of efficient habits of expression—and doubtless did so operate in rare instances. But the kernel of habit—the purely automatic and unconscious character of its reaction—was very far from an effective recognition. When the futility of grammatical instruction was generally agreed upon, a reform movement took, as is usually the case, quite the opposite direction. It was grammar that was at fault, consequently there must be no grammar. Its place must be taken by language lessons, and since the essence of grammar is its logical coherence and organization, so the more incoherent and illogical the language lessons could be made, the greater would be the chance that they would correct the old defects. But this, quite naturally, was found to make matters worse instead of better. After all, the trouble did not lie in the mere matter of logical organization. That, in itself, was found to have rather a beneficial influence. The real difficulty lay in the comparative ease of mastering general principles and the extreme difficulty of applying these principles over and over again until the appropriate forms became thoroughly automatic. And so the next reform brought in a new factor: It attempted to provide a motive for application and repetition. The teacher of language turned to the content subjects for more interesting material, and attempted in various ways to inspire the pupil with a desire for correct expression. But this has been a long and tedious road to travel, and the results are still far from satisfactory.

I instance this specific habit of expression simply to press my point, and my point is this: If education finds it so difficult to build efficient habits in a comparatively simple field, dealing with very tangible and definite reactions, how much more difficult will be its task in the broader fields, such, for example, as that represented by the telegrapher's inadequacy in "habits of carefulness?"

And if the problem which seemed on its surface so simple has already proved so difficult what shall we say when we find that

it is still further complicated by a much more important factor? Until recently it has been assumed that a habit, once established, would continue to operate in all situations of life wherever it might be needed. That this assumption failed to work out in practice did not seem to invalidate it in the least. Entire curricula were constructed under the guidance of the dogma that specific habits could be generalized indefinitely. The child might be disciplined into the most effective habits of promptness in the school, and yet fail to meet his first business engagement upon the stroke of the clock; the youth might be trained to reason with unerring certainty in his geometry, and yet fail to evince the slightest evidence of that ability in his later adjustments in business; the college student might win high honors in the study of the observational sciences, and yet find his trained observation incompetent to detect corruption in politics and chicanery in finance. These practical tests of the doctrine of formal discipline in its naïve formulation have failed upon every hand, and yet the doctrine has died a hard death—in fact, it is still far from inanimate even in contemporary educational theory and practice. But experimental investigation has clearly revealed its inadequacy. We can hammer away at tardiness until our record is perfect, and yet we cannot be sure that our pupils will be any more prompt in meeting their out-of-school engagements than will the pupils of our neighbor, whose class record is the disgrace of the school. We may drill upon correct expression until not an erroneous form creeps into our recitations, and still not know whether the first words that our pupils utter when they go out upon the playground—much less into the walks of adult life—may not represent enough samples of false syntax to satisfy the demands of even the old grammarians. And even though the telegrapher's teachers might have drilled him into the most efficient habits of carefulness and attention in his school work, we could not assume that these would *necessarily* function, even the slightest degree, in his later work. In other words, the mere formation of a specific habit or of a set of specific habits is not in itself a conclusive proof that these habits

will function in situations other than those in which they have been formed, or in closely parallel situations.

On the surface, all of this seems to justify nothing but the most hopeless sort of an outlook. Truly, if formal discipline is an impossible task—if habits are adequate only to the situations in which they have been formed—what we call general education must be in a very bad way. The school must restrict its function to matters of instruction, and even in these it must assume no value other than that which accrues intrinsically to the facts and principles learned. In this case, it is safe to predict that all training must become technical and vocational, and I think that I am safe in saying that there is at present a well-marked tendency toward this very end. The college and university reveal this tendency most clearly, but the high schools are coming to feel its influence. The traditional courses which were supposed to provide general culture and discipline are being replaced by courses that are more or less vocational in character.

Even in the elementary school, the rejection of the dogma of formal discipline is exerting a modifying influence. The methods that were formerly assumed to develop the stern virtues of accuracy and industry and duty and obedience have, in many cases, been discarded or greatly modified. Indeed, why subject the pupil to the hardships of a discipline not needed for immediate ends when the chances are so few that this discipline can be applied to remote ends? Why insist upon obedience, if the habits of obedience gained in the school cannot be generalized into the attitude of respect for law and authority, upon which every civilized government must depend for survival? True, hoodlumism is increasing at an alarming rate. True, the American child is becoming more and more a law unto himself and not infrequently a source of trial and tribulation to the adult members of society. The old-fashioned parent would have settled the difficulty in a trice, but should one inflict pain upon another merely to subserve the interests of one's own comfort, when science asserts that no remote end would be gained thereby and that irremediable injury might be caused? We could formerly justify heroic measures of discipline on the ground that our

personal comfort was only an incident and that it was the remote end of civilizing the little savage that impelled us to take harsh measures. But now selfishness is the only excuse.

What is the responsibility of the school (or even of the home) for developing the controls of conduct? In the light of contemporary educational theory, one is forced to answer, Nil. Responsibility goes only with power, and power is plainly denied us—at least if the contemporary theory is valid.

But is it valid? and if not, what is its fallacy? After all, have we generalized too hastily? Have we discarded the dogma of formal discipline and repudiated the value of general training with insufficient consideration? Have we really accounted for every possible factor that might influence our judgment?

Personally, while I believe that those who still cling to the dogma in its original form cannot justify their position, I also believe that those who have entirely cast aside the idea of formal training have done so too hastily. In fact, there is now some basis for a reactionary movement in the experiments which seem to indicate that memory, for example, can be markedly improved by exercises of a very formal nature. But aside from this there is still another factor that has been neglected.

In order to make clear my own position upon this matter, let me refer to a type of conduct rather different from those just discussed. Why are you and I decent and peaceful and law-abiding—assuming, of course, that we are. Why do you and I refrain from doing unseemly things? If we were brought face to face with that question, I believe that most of us would answer that we do not do unseemly things because reason tells us not to. But this is probably far from the real truth. You and I and the rest of the men and women who live ordinarily decent lives do so very largely through the force of habit. Let us suppose that you are in a jewelry store and that you see a tray of beautiful and costly diamond rings lying upon the top of the showcase. The clerks are busy in another part of the store, and you examine these rings casually and yet admiringly. Let us suppose that you have long wished to possess a diamond ring the

very counterpart of one that is right there within your reach. Why do you not slip the ring into your pocket? Let us assume that you would run absolutely no danger of detection in the theft. You tell me that your judgment tells you that this would be stealing; but judgment in your case and in mine, I hope, very seldom operates in a situation like this. As a matter of fact, you do not feel the slightest temptation to take the ring. Why? Simply because habits of honesty have been drilled into you from the earliest infancy. There is little judgment involved in the control of conduct in such a situation, because the demand for judgment is not present. In reality, there is no situation there. A situation might arise under the proper conditions. Nature tells you to appropriate the thing that pleases you. But civilized society tells you to respect the rights of others, and civilized society has been having the better of it for so long that the primitive, natural craving has been quite hushed. In short, if you and I had constantly to reason ourselves into being good, we should not be good very long. We are either good by habit or we go to the bad very quickly.

Now this, it will be agreed, approaches very close to what may be termed a general habit—to the very thing that formal discipline was supposed to engender. How has this habit been formed? Obviously not from specific experiences in that identical situation. You do not need to have suffered painful consequences for the theft of diamond rings in order to build up the habit of not appropriating diamond rings when you want them.

In order to envisage a possible solution of this problem, let us vary the conditions of the illustration. Let us assume that, instead of feeling no temptation to take the ring, one does feel the very slightest impulse. In other words, let us assume that habit is inadequate to the solution of the situation. Inherited impulse, left to itself, would solve the situation disastrously. What is it that checks and controls this impulse? Is it an intellectual judgment—this act is stealing; stealing is a sin; consequently I will inhibit the impulse? I venture to say that, if the judgment were of this bare intellectual type, it would exert not

the slightest inhibiting force upon the impulse. What really determines conduct in such a situation is undoubtedly an *emotional wave*—an undefined and intangible, but thoroughly conscious, *feeling of repugnance* for the act itself. Let me ask if this is not a fair description of the controlling force in your own moments of temptation—if you ever have such moments. Impulse and emotion are so closely related as genetically not to be distinguishable; and unless one can oppose an inherited impulse with an idea that is just as powerfully colored with emotion, the impulse is bound to conquer. The idea alone, as a product of intellection, has not the weight of a feather in determining conduct in critical situations. It is the emotionalized idea—it is the *ideal*—that must hold the reins of conduct when instinct is battling for the control.

And this, it seems to me, is the explanation of the barrenness of our attempts to teach morality from the didactic standpoint. We see it coming out most clearly perhaps in that horrible example of pedagogical inefficiency that we call temperance physiology. In eight years of didactic instruction in temperance, the teacher usually accomplishes less in developing real controls of conduct, even in children whose plasticity and adaptability are the hope of the race, than an unlettered temperance reformer, with the fire of enthusiasm coursing through his veins, can accomplish in a single hour with adults who might reasonably be supposed to have every factor of control irrevocably fixed. This is the reason, also, that didactic ethics has so little influence in modifying the conduct of its students. This is why every attempt to read emotion out of religion has weakened the power of the church in controlling the conduct of its communicants. The power of an efficient incentive to action is always a direct function of the emotion that is back of it.

What term will most adequately describe the prime controls of conduct—the factors that govern adjustment in really critical situations? The term that I propose is this, “emotionalized prejudice.” The adjective may be redundant, but I insert it in order that there may be no doubt as to the prime factor.

A man of science was once trying to persuade me that the

trend of mental progress was toward the elimination of the emotions. As an illustration, he adduced his own clear-thinking logic engine of a mind, the workings of which, he assured me, had not the slightest emotional tinge. I could easily find it in my heart to pardon his egotism, for, with his next breath, he exclaimed passionately, "I am a priest of truth, and I worship the naked fact!" Not having with me the instruments of exact measurements with which emotions may be identified, I could not convince him that his mind was, at that moment, surcharged with a powerful affective process—but I convinced myself. And surely if the training that we give to students in science amounts to anything more than a mastery of technique and the assimilation of a few technical facts and principles, it must amount to this: the development of a prejudice, highly colored with positive emotional force, toward truth and veracity and impersonal observation and dispassionate judgment—*an emotional attitude against emotion, a prejudice against prejudice*. And similarly I should maintain that the student of mathematics should come from his study of algebra and geometry and calculus with a highly emotionalized prejudice toward that method of close, logical thinking that mathematics, above all other disciplines, represents.

It is true that not all students derive these prejudices from the pursuit of mathematics and science. Mastery of subject-matter does not involve this as a necessary consequence. But to some students, a long acquaintance with, and contemplation of, the methods by which some of man's greatest conquests over nature have been made possible give a profound sense of the worth and value of these methods—a feeling of respect and perhaps of reverence which supplies the emotional coloring essential to the modification of conduct in later adjustments. And I am certain that the efficiency of such a prejudice is a function, in part at least, of the time and effort that have been given to the mastery of the subject. After all, the things that appeal to us most strongly from the emotional aspect are the things that we have gained at the cost of effort and struggle; and the belief that the "tough" subjects of the curriculum have

the greatest disciplinary value has a psychological basis in this fact.

I am here speaking of no vague, indefinite "mental power" or "mental faculty" that may be developed by the studies. The factor to which I refer may be intangible and elusive, but I maintain that it is thoroughly consistent with the accepted principles of modern psychology. The consciousness of power is often as important in gaining a victory as the possession of power. Indeed, it is the emotional force of a belief that renders the power itself dynamic rather than potential. The graduate of Cambridge may never use his mathematics in solving the situations of his later life, but it is possible that he has gained something from his mastery of mathematics that will help him more in solving a situation than he could be helped by any amount of instruction regarding the technique of that situation. The "something" that he has perhaps gained is a consciousness of conquest, or, if I may use a street phrase, the knowledge that he has been "up against" the "toughest" problems that the mind of man can devise and has come out a victor. Certainly his mastery of mathematics does not necessarily involve this feeling of confidence; but it *may* involve it, and, in case it does, there can be no doubt of its value in making his future adjustments more efficient.

This does not mean, of course, that one would decry the virtue of that technical and vocational education which aims to furnish specific facts and principles for the solution of specific situations. I assert simply this: that far more fundamental than the technical facts are the prejudices in favor of dogged persistence, unflinching application, relentless industry, and a determination to conquer, whatever the cost. These combined with technical knowledge and skill can spell nothing less than efficiency. Without technical knowledge, they might ultimately win, but the price of victory would be unnecessarily high and the chances of failure much greater. But technical knowledge alone without these other factors must spell disaster in every critical situation.

And I should not say that these prejudices which are so

important cannot be engendered through the processes of education that give one technical knowledge and skill. I believe, however, that, as a rule, applied science is frequently less efficient, in this respect, than pure science, and applied mathematics than pure mathematics. Pure science and pure mathematics constantly emphasize the system and unity of the subject-matter. In a certain sense, the contemplation of a large system of knowledge has much in common with the contemplation of a great work of art. It is a unity in which every part is definitely related to every other part, in which there are no gaps, or lacunae, or jagged edges. And the emotional factor, I believe, is a function, in part, of this aesthetic quality—but I should not press this point.

But there still remains unanswered a question that was raised a little way back. Granting that emotionalized prejudices of a very effective sort may be engendered in the study of science and mathematics, what shall we say with regard to the generalization of specific habits such as those formed in the earlier stages of education? What is the value of disciplining the child into specific habits of promptness, or neatness, or accuracy? Will specific training give rise to emotionalized prejudices in favor of the virtues that the discipline represents? If it does, there can be no doubt that the effects of training may be generalized or carried over to situations other than those in which the training has been given.

Personally, I believe that we get most of our effective prejudices from just this source of early training, but it is, of course, true that the specific habits might be very adequately formed without at the same time engendering the corresponding prejudices. The indeterminate factor is the emotional factor. The discipline of the early home life is the great breeding ground of prejudices *because of the positive and profound emotional factors that operate*. (I mean by "positive" factors those that operate in favor of the virtues in question.) The most powerful prejudices upon which civilized society rests are engendered in the home—honesty, cleanliness, decency, self-denial. Except as these are taught by precept and example, and

fortified by specific habits, and thoroughly imbued with positive emotional force, the social fabric must surely fall to pieces.

It is for these prejudices in particular that the home must be responsible. The school can do little to develop them unless the school takes over all of the educative functions of the home, and even then the weakness of the most important factor of all—the emotional factor—is apt to make the attempt abortive. But the school in turn must stand sponsor for certain prejudices that the home cannot always be depended upon to engender, and among these one must certainly include accuracy, promptness, industry, application, efficiency, order, respect for the rights and feelings of others, respect for authority, for truth, and for justice.

The important point is this: The specific habits which have reference to these various virtues are insufficient; *it is the prejudice in their favor that is the significant thing*. And this explains in part the failure of our older methods of teaching to develop efficient controls. We thought that the habit was the prime essential. We neglected the prejudice. And so we took the shortest road to the habit, forgetting that we might thereby be inducing a prejudice of quite the opposite kind—forgetting that *prejudices not only generalize habits, but sometimes negate them*. And so the net result has been very frequently to promote the very end that we sought to avoid. A prejudice against work and application and concentrated attention has often been engendered by the heart-rending, back-breaking grind of toil imposed upon the child of the farm. A prejudice against morality has been developed more than once, I believe, by the namby-pamby methods of the Sunday school. And I am more than tolerably certain that a prejudice against temperance has been promoted, in many cases, by the methods that we have taken to build temperate habits.

Again it is the emotional factor that must be considered, and this sometimes works in the most unexpected ways. Do we believe that imposing difficult tasks upon the pupil will develop in him that prejudice in favor of persistence and application and close, sustained attention, which is so necessary in meeting the

situations of later life? How do we know that, instead of this, we are not developing its antithesis, and that he will not acquire a repugnance for these virtues? Do we believe that we can avoid the difficulty by catering to his interests? How do we know that we shall not develop a prejudice against all effort that is not bribed and all tasks that are not attractive? Or, do we wish to put the pupil into an habitual attitude of respect for authority? How can we be certain that we do not overshoot the mark, and make him a subservient tool, lacking in all initiative? Do we try to obviate this difficulty by leaving his inherited impulses to work themselves out without let or hindrance? How do we know that the liberty of childhood may not engender a prejudice in favor of license in manhood? Are these merely academic questions? Ask any principal of an elementary school who is face to face with the responsibility for governing five hundred children and who is endowed with both a brain and a heart. It is precisely these problems that such a man must attempt to solve at every turn of the day's work.

One can find no better example of the difficulty of solving these problems than is presented in the one department of education in which we have consciously attempted to develop an emotionalized prejudice, namely, the teaching of literature. From present indications, it would seem that our attempt to force upon the child an appreciation of art in any of its forms has been most barren in its results. The music hall still holds forth its allurements in spite of our costly experiment in public-school music. The variety stage draws with its blandishments those who have been carefully taught how to enjoy Shakspeare. All the garish distractions of our great cities prosper on the earnings, not of our unlettered immigrants, but of the products of our own public schools.

Have we not in this problem of developing prejudices both the most important and the most difficult problem of educational science? Is it not the crux of the whole question of moral education? Is it not the most significant factor in social improvement? Should it not receive adequate recognition in the present

radical reconstructions to which the curricula of our high schools and colleges are being subjected?

Obviously enough, the key to the situation lies in the emotional factors; but here, unhappily, we need a key that will unlock the key. At the very outset, we confront a danger that will do much to defeat our purpose. I refer to the danger of sentimentalism. Our present conception of the emotional life is far too narrow and restricted to serve as a basis for fruitful investigation from the standpoint that I have proposed. In popular use, the word "emotion" is heavily freighted with associations that make it a veritable bugbear for scientific research. And no small source of the negative prejudices that we are now developing in education is this silly, sentimental recognition of the emotional factors so-called that is little less than disgusting to the serious and self-respecting student. If you wish to give a boy a first-class prejudice against nature, put him through the average course in nature-study that has for its object the development of a love for nature's beauty. What the true emotional nature of the boy craves is not something to love, but something to respect. Love is a word that ought always to be in our hearts, but seldom upon our lips, lest we cheapen the sentiment by constant reiteration. And the emotional factors to which we give the name "love" function in only a weakened form prior to puberty, and even after puberty, the less ado that we make about them in education, the more completely, I believe, will their ideal elements emerge from the background of instinct and become positive forces in the control of conduct. Just now we hear upon every side that the child must love his school, he must love his work, he must love his teacher, he must love literature, he must love art, he must love nature; but we never hear that he must respect anything, except (and this only by implication) his own whims and fancies. Now respect is just as thoroughly a sentiment as is love, and with the preadolescent child, it is based upon a far more powerful emotion. I might also add, although I may seem unorthodox, that the only kind of love worth having is the kind that grows out of respect.

Now this is far from saying that the teacher should not have

a genuine affection for his pupils. Love of that type comes from the other side and is based upon parental instincts—paternal or maternal—that are fundamental. The person who does not feel the power of these instincts is abnormal, and certainly has no place among teachers.

And so the first step in the solution of our problem must be an investigation of the emotional forces that govern conduct—using the term emotion in the very broad sense that I have suggested. This will be no simple task, but the full investment of education with scientific dignity and worth must await its outcome. We must come to know in a fairly definite and concise form the number and sources of these great controls of conduct. Now we know them only in the vaguest fashion. We know that there are certain emotionalized ideas, like the principle of religious liberty, or the principle of equality under the law, which have dominated councils of war and stained battle fields; that there are certain emotionalized standards, like honesty and chastity and personal honor, which not infrequently determine the greatest and most critical of individual adjustments; that there are certain powerfully emotionalized abstractions, like truth, or faith, or service, which may map out the entire trend of a man's life and mark the clear path of his career; that there are certain profoundly emotionalized conceptions, like friendship, or motherhood, or divinity, which only not quite defy the words of a David or a Job to formulate, or the pigments of a Raphael to depict, but which still lie somewhere deeply imbedded in every human motive that makes for what we call the right. Of these, at present, we can say with certainty only this: that somewhere during that long period of human plasticity which we call childhood and youth, they are implanted in the heart, there to work out into action and bring forth fruit of their kind. Now perhaps the seeds are sown by precept and admonition; now by objective example and conscious imitation; now by long years of growth and training and discipline; now by a sudden flash of inspiration. Many, and these doubtless the most potent, come from the home, others from the social environment, others from religion, others from the *Zeitgeist*, others from literature and art

and history and biography. But some must surely come from the school, and in all of them the influence of the school must be felt. Whether we will or no, we cannot escape the responsibility.

And even if the more accurate investigations are still to be made, the very recognition of the importance of these factors should have its effect upon the actual work of teaching. When the teacher asks himself not only what he wishes to impart in the way of knowledge and train in the way of habits, but also what sort of prejudices and what sort of standards and what sort of ideals he wishes to give his pupils, the very attitude of questioning will, I believe, modify his work in the direction of greater efficiency. We cannot all be teachers like Pestalozzi or Froebel or Arnold or Sheldon or Parker, but we can all appreciate the characteristic that made these men masters of their craft. We can know that they were great and influential, not merely because of the knowledge that they possessed, but far more fundamentally because of the ideals with which they were inspired, and that their influence was due to the facility and skill with which they could pass on this inspiration to their pupils. And, knowing this, we, too, may be encouraged to strive for idealism to the end that our pupils may feel, however feebly, the uplift, and catch a glimpse, however fleeting of the sunlit peaks.